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Analysis
O. GODARD CLIMATE CHANGE: A SURVEY OF THE STERN REVIEW
1. INTRODUCTION
The Review of Economics on Climate Change was prepared
under the responsibility of Sir Nicholas Stern, Head of the
British Government Economics Service and Adviser to the
British Government on the economics of climate change at
the request of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Rt. Hon.
Gordon Brown. Launched in autumn 2005, the review was
drafted by an ad hoc team of some twenty experts,
climatologists and economists working under the steering
of Sir Nicholas Stern. Various research centres were asked
to submit a set of specialised theme studies. A consultation
procedure which included a call for contributions was also
set up. The report was finally published on October 30, 2006.
Since its publication, the Stern Review has given rise to
much comment and a number of statements. It came under
criticism from economists and a few climatologists.
Between November 2006 and February 2007, the Stern
Review team sought to clarify points that had been found
obscure or misleading and also to refute criticisms that they
considered to be unfounded. As a result a number of
supplementary documents were prepared, including in
particular three summaries of reflections and responses
that were put on line on February 12, 2007. As was to be
expected, the authors of the report accepted that certain
technical points could have been broached differently, but
despite criticism, maintain that their approach is justified,
that it is scientifically and ethically well founded and that
their conclusions are robust.
The present article is assigned two goals. First, it is intended
to present the main points made in the report and the body
of information, factual data and quantitative evaluations
which form the Review's substantial contribution to the
subject, supplementing the main results and principal
recommendations which it arrives at. This presentation is
based essentially on the report itself but also takes account
of additional contributions (see the list in Box 1). To this
regard, the paper does not aim to introduce a critical
discussion of specific data or statements included in the
Review, which is already a referenced review of scientific
literature. Secondly, since the Stern Review triggered a
significant critical debate, it is no more the appropriate time
to produce just another critique of the Stern Review itself.
Meanwhile, it has been deemed useful to give an aperçu of
the debate on key framing points and to enter in a critical
examination of this debate. Not all economists, especially in
the USA, have been sympathetic with the methodological
choices and the results delivered by the Stern Review. Are
these criticisms as convincing as their authors would wish?
BOX 1 - Reference documents published by the Stern
Review team
-N. Stern (dir.) (2006), The Stern Review Report: the
Economics of Climate Change.
London, HM Treasury, October 30, 603 p.
-N. Stern (dir.), (2006) Postscript to the Stern Review Report,
December, 7 p.
-N. Stern (dir.) (2006) Technical Annex to Postscript,
December, 13 p.
-N. Stern (dir.) (2007) Response to key themes in recent cri-
tiques of the Stern Review,
January, 2 p.
-N. Stern (dir.) (2007), Stern Review – Frequently asked
questions, January, 10 p. 
-N. Stern (dir.) (2007) After the Stern Review: reflections and
responses, 12 February: 
-Paper A: “The case for action to reduce the risks of climate
change”, 50 p.
-Paper B: “Value judgements, welfare weights and dis-
counting: issues and evidence”, 18 p.
-Paper C: “Building an effective international response to
climate change”, 32 p.
These documents are available on the internet at:
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/6520.htm
In the following references to the core report are indexed as ‘SR’.
2. GENERAL PRESENTATION
2.1. CONTENTS OF THE REVIEW
The report, totalling almost 600 pages, resembles in
perspective and presentation reports by the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC); it adopts
a global perspective and is based on salient points observed
in a broad subject-by-subject review of international scientific
literature. It does however reveal a greater degree of freedom
as regards the selection of sources and the normative choices
on which the proposed evaluation is based, in particular as
regards ethical standpoints. Unlike the IPCC reports the Stern
Review was not submitted to an extensive international peer-
review process. Its status is that of a report prepared over a
period of one year by a single team at the behest of a
government. That being said, the report also mentions
sectoral studies specially commissioned for the purpose. The
Stern Review team itself produced original simulation and
evaluation work, using a pre-existing model, PAGE2002
(Hope, 2006), to produce a set of scenarios and values on
climate change and resulting damage.
As a result of the above process, the contents of the report are
somewhat hybrid: the variety of source data in combination
with the use of a single model prevents the exercise from
being totally coherent. Methodological simplifications and
somewhat arbitrary choices were introduced which can of
24
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course be disputed. Combining normative choices grounded
on ethics and approaching the impact on economic agents’
welfare on the basis of market data supposed to express
relevant utility aspects through the willingness to pay of those
presently living agents also leads to some gaps and
discrepancies: due to cognitive biases and psycho-
sociological obstacles (Dupuy and Grinbaum, 2005;
Bazerman, 2006), interpreting observed markets as
expression of relevant preferences just reproduces an
irrational way to consider the issue of climate change.
BOX 2 - Discounting future damages
Getting an aggregate assessment of impacts of climate
change implies a means to compare and weigh damages
experienced at different dates from now to the distant future.
The ratio between the value of an extra damage unit at some
future date and the present value given to this same unit of
damage is called the discount factor. The way the value of this
discount factor is increasing with time is called the discount
rate. Formally, the discount rate is analogous to an interest
rate on the capital market. From a standard economic
perspective, the practice of discounting embraces two
components: first an observation that individuals generally
have a preference for the present, which means that they
prefer consuming a good today than tomorrow, and tomorrow
instead of the day after tomorrow, and so on –impatience-;
this is supposed to be a key variable underpinning savings
behaviors and explaining why borrowers have to pay an
interest; second, because of economic growth allowed by
investment, there is a presumption that people will get richer
in the future than today; hence, the utility derived from one
additional unit of consumption decreases when people
become richer. Earning one more dollar when you already
have $1Million is less attractive than if you have only $100.
Consequently, the standard formula used in social cost-
benefit analysis is the following: r = ∂ + ηg with r the social
discount rate, ∂ the pure time preference rate, η the elasticity
of marginal utility of per capita consumption, and g the per
capita consumption growth rate.
The subject matter ranges from identification of the various
categories of climatic impact to disaggregated evaluation of the
damages, then their aggregated evaluation in a monetary
framework, with finally an evaluation of the political response
strategies. The report therefore contains six sections. The first
one (SR, pp. 1-54) reports on recent climate data and defines the
framework of the economic evaluation exercise. The second one
(SR, pp. 55-167) makes an inventory of data on impacts and
includes them in an integrated evaluation model to arrive at an
evaluation of damages. The third one (SR, pp. 168-307) deals
with the economics of stabilisation of atmospheric
concentrations of greenhouse gases (emission paths depending
on various targeted concentration levels, cost calculations,
competitiveness issues, comparison of costs and benefits). The
fourth one (SR, pp. 308-402) studies mitigation policies based on
a reduction of net greenhouse gas (GHG) emission levels. The
fifth section (SR, pp. 403-448) deals with economic adaptation
policies of individuals and economies to the portion of climate
change which will still be taking place despite the level of
prevention adopted. The sixth and last section (SR, pp. 449-475)
broaches the issue of international action.
2.2. A CLASSICAL WELFARE ECONOMICS APPROACH
ENRICHED BY CONCERNS FOR INTRA AND INTERGENERA-
TIONAL ETHICS AND ECONOMICS OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY
The essential options chosen to structure the evaluation reside,
albeit with caution, in the tradition of orthodox welfare
economics which the report handles with sophistication: a
consequentialist and utilitarian approach to evaluate the
damages; a comparison between the cost of damages and the
cost of prevention and adaptation to determine a range of
desirable policies; a proposal to ensure a satisfying emission
pathways over 200 years (until 2200) using the probabilistic
approach of climatic risk, moderated however by numerous
warnings that models have their limits and are only indicative.
Despite the constraints imposed by the purpose of a review, the
Stern report contains some new and original aspects compared
to work previously published by IPCC. Originality resides in
some cases in the approach itself; in others it is due to a
marshalling of results which were more recent than those used
by IPCC in its 2001 report (see Box 3 for a short account of
results of 2007 report of IPCC WG 1).
The approach displays originality on three counts:
1) It underlines the dimensions of the risk and the uncertainty
regarding climate damages, taking account of what economists
designate as "risk and ambiguity aversion", instead of confining
itself to standard mean values; the main body of risk accounting
is done by calculating probabilities and adopting risk aversion
coefficients. Uncertainty proper, remaining outside probabilistic
assessment, is taken into account either indirectly by giving
sustained attention to "extreme" possibilities identified in the
literature, or by qualitative pronouncements added to
probabilistic quantitative evaluations and underlining the need
to prepare for higher damage values than those which would
result from these secured quantitative evaluations.
2) It introduces correction factors for gross loss of welfare
values to take into account the considerable income
inequalities between countries affected by climatic impacts
(industrialised, emerging and developing countries); these
correction factors give a higher value to the welfare effect of
a monetary damage unit when victims have a lower income.
The coefficient elasticity equals 1. In the context of the utility
function adopted, this means that gross damage of one euro
suffered by someone whose income is 100 has a weight
which is ten times greater than a damage of the same worth
affecting someone whose income is 1000; or that an action
which would reduce marginally the rich man's income by 10,
25
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but would improve the poor man's by at least 1, would
improve collective welfare.
3) It adopts a normative framework giving the same welfare weight
(utility) to all generations to appear until 2200, except for a small
coefficient representing the probability of mankind's
disappearance (due for example to a large meteorite colliding with
the planet); in technical terms, the utility of the successive
generations is almost left untouched by discounting. The main
reason for discounting in the Stern Review is therefore not time, but
the expected increase in future wealth per capita due to economic
growth. This produces a low discount rate (central rate is 1.4%)
reflecting essentially the expectation of increased consumption (in
a general sense) per capita in the long term (1.3%).
The Stern Review therefore uses a framework of assumptions
which, although not entirely new and explicitly grounded in
well-established economic and ethical reflection, are
nevertheless rather original compared to those which govern
a significant portion of the work of economists on climate
change, in particular in respect of the discount rate, which
appeared to be one of the major points of dissent. The Stern
Review considers that the problem under study (a global very
long term issue) is such that there must be a break with the
traditional practices used by public administration for project
analysis, which are only settled for a rather short time period
comparing with the two centuries chosen by the Stern Review.
Based on both ethics and long term growth assumptions, the
rate is designed to balance the conflicting demands of
attitudes to risk and value judgements on distributive justice
(the greater the inclination to redistributing wealth from rich
to poor, the higher the rate since future generations are
supposed to be richer, on the mean, than present ones) and
inter-generational ethics (the greater the concern for the
interests of future generations, the lower the rate). I come
back to the discussion of discounting in section 6.3.
2.3. METHODOLOGICAL FEATURES FUR-
THER EXPLAINING ORIGINAL RESULTS
The conclusions of the Review are also rather original because
of three further features:
1) It uses a model belonging to a climato-economic family
developed in the last fifteen years called Integrated
Assessment Models (IAMs) which integrate into the same
model the relationships between economic development
pathways, GHG emissions, atmospheric concentrations of
GHGs, climatic changes and their various impacts, essentially
productive and commercial impacts (loss of agricultural
production, loss of natural resources, loss of real estate and
infrastructure, impact on energy consumption). When valuing
these impacts, the Stern Review also considered the
environmental and health repercussions (morbidity and
mortality, loss of ecosystems and species extinction) as such
and the contingent indirect effects (investment depression,
migrations, conflicts and political instability), beyond loss in
output and income.
2) It takes into account the most recent studies on climatology
considering various possibilities of positive feedback loops
amplifying climate disequilibrium (weakening of plant and
ocean carbon sinks, methane emission from thawing frozen
ground, ocean hydrates methane emissions, etc.). As a result
the Stern Review attaches greater importance to the possibility
of diverging to new and more unstable climatic regimes for
which long term values would tend towards the higher values
of key parameters. Generally speaking, the assessment of
incidence on the mean global temperature for a given level of
atmospheric GHG concentration is higher than in previous
IPCC reports and also than in the IPCC Working Group I Fourth
Assessment Report (2007) (see Box 3 and Figure 1).
Furthermore, the studies used by the Stern Review team now
formulate probabilities on proposed values. For a 550 ppm
CO2e (CO2 emissions plus other GHGs converted as a function
of their warming potential index in 100 years – see Box 4 for a
definition of ppm) the increase of average temperature values
proposed by a battery of models range from 1.5 degrees to 4.5
degrees Celsius for a confidence interval of 95% probability,
with a central value of 3 degrees, whereas this concentration
level was long associated with an increase of only 2 degrees,
for example for the objectives adopted by the European
Commission. According to data used in the Stern Review, the
central concentration value which could be expected to limit
the temperature rise to 2°C is 450 ppm of CO2e, leaving
approximately 390 ppm for CO2 alone (see Figure 2)1. These
figures have been confirmed by the 2007 IPCC Fourth
Assessment Report: compare Figures 2 and 3 thereafter.
BOX 3 - IPCC Working Group I Fourth Assessment Report,
Summary for Policymakers (February 2, 2007).
The Summary indicates in particular that positive feedback
which could amplify climate change has not been included
in the assessment of future evolution of mean global
warming or rising sea levels values because of scientific
uncertainty on the subject.
It states that global surface temperatures have risen by
0.70° C during the 20th century (0.76 since 1850) and that
additional temperature increases in the course of the 21st
century could range between 1.8 and 3.9°C in median values
depending on the scenarios studied, which is a spread of
total median values between 2.5 and 4.6°C compared to the
beginning of the industrial age. Considering the whole range
of values for each IPCC scenario, the results are values
situated between the two extremes of 1.8 and 7.1°C,
compared to the same pre-industrial values. The breadth of
the range reflects mainly two components: scientific
uncertainties on the one hand, and historical uncertainties
on human development paths during the present century
26
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and even sometimes conflicting interests, these reports must be considered as representing a minima formulations.
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and the ensuing GHG emission paths on the other hand.
Although a certain level of climate change seems inevitable,
its magnitude will depend to a considerable degree on
human activity in the next decades.
3) It uses a specific non-linear function to represent the
relationship between temperature increases and the intensity
of effects and damage. In support of that process, the Stern
Review quotes some empirical data. For example, in certain
regions, an increase in average temperature of 1 degree can
multiply by 10 the frequency of extreme heat waves; an
applied modelling run produced by William Nordhaus (2006)
for hurricanes shows that an increase of 5 to 10% of the
intensity of this type of event can lead to doubling damage. For
instance Hurricane Katrina alone, in 2005, caused total
economic damage estimated by Munich Re at $125bn,
representing 1.2% of US GDP for one year, of which only half
was insured (SR, p. 132).
BOX 4 - What ppm are.
ppm (parts per million) is the ratio of the number of GHG
molecules to the total number of molecules of dry air. 1 ppm
equals one millionth. The atmospheric concentration of the 6
GHGs considered by the Kyoto Protocol ranges from 280
(preindustrial value) to 380 (present value) for CO2 and 430 for
all Kyoto GHGs. In the future, by 2100, figures are expected to
be between 450 (quasi-stabilization at present global values)
if policies are very proactive and implemented immediately,
and 1000 with a business-as-usual (BAU) scenario. Over the
last decade, the annual CO2 concentration growth was 1.9
ppm. 1 extra ppm corresponds to emissions of 15 to 20 Gt
CO2. The present level of concentration of GHGs is without
precedent in the last 650,000 years (IPCC, 2007, p. 2) and
presumably still more.
3. IMPORTANT MESSAGES
In this ambitious assessment report several striking
messages stand out and a few catch phrases have caught
the public eye.
3.1. MAJOR AND LASTING POTENTIAL DAMAGE
As regards physical impacts, a doubling of the pre-industrial
concentration of GHG (280 ppm), i.e. around 550 ppm, which
would be reached between 2030 and 2060, would probably imply
a mean long run equilibrium temperature increase, compared
to pre-industrial values, within a 2 to 5°C range. At that level of
GHG concentration, there would be a 20% chance that average
temperature would be in excess of 5 degrees. A 5 degree rise in
temperature would be without precedent in all the history of
mankind and corresponds to the same kind of difference as
between the present situation and the last ice age.
Such a change would inflict physical damage on the natural
environment, human life and health, but would also have an
effect on the variouscomponents of productive capital, leading
to a significant impact on the possibility of economic growth.
The negative effect on investment could, in cumulative
incidence, at least double the level of direct damage
measured in loss of consumption per inhabitant of traded and
non-traded goods and services. In order to reduce the
vulnerability of the poorest countries and facilitate their
adaptation, the Stern Review advocates urgent fostering of
their growth and development.
When all types of damage are aggregated, climate change
would involve a serious and lasting loss of consumption and
wellbeing. If all the temporal, geographic and social
differentials are eliminated in order to produce a simple
"smoothed" repre-sentation, like an annuity in a set of
heterogeneous financial flows, all of the climate changes
would be equivalent, in wellbeing, of an annual and
irreversible permanent rate of loss of an increasing global per
capita consumption. According to the degree of integration of
various categories of phenomena, this permanent rate of loss
could be in the 5%-20% range. If only gross productive and
trade impacts are measured, they total 5%. Taking into
account the incidence on human health (induced mortality)
and environmental losses (rapid erosion of biodiversity), the
cost rises to 11%. Taking on board the risks of overresponse
of the climate to concentrations (amplifying feedback) the
result is 14%. Finally, since damage would be concentrated in
the poorest areas and by taking account of indirect contingent
effects, economic, demographic and political (migrations,
conflicts) ones in particular, the figure would approach 20%. 
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FIGURE 1: Incidence of various development scenarios on global
average temperature (base of comparison: 2000 temperature) 
This figure shows expected temperature increases in some IPCC
scenarios. The reference year is 2000, not pre-industrial levels,
that are 0.7 °C lower. The number of modelling runs for a given
time period and scenario is indicated by the coloured numbers at
the bottom part of the panel. The orange line represents a
benchmark hypothetical scenario where concentrations are held
constant at year 2000 values. Other lines represent IPCC
scenarios. The gray bars at right indicate the best estimate (solid
line within each bar) and the likely range assessed for six basic
IPCC scenarios. Extract from Summary for Policymakers -
WG1-IPCC, February 2007, p. 21 
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The examples given to present these results reflect the
figures: mankind would be confronted with lasting damages
equivalent to those brought on by the economic crisis of 1929
or the two world wars in the 20th century.
This first presentation of the conclusions of the Stern Review
should not be downsized but supplemented by considering a
set of additional factors and features.
Some scientists have put forward the assumption that a very
moderate climate change could have positive effects for
economic development, at least in certain parts of the world
(Siberia, etc.). The Stern Review does not
exclude that theory but remarks that
recent literature reduces its scope. The
"positive" estimates (availability of new
areas for agriculture, increases in
agricultural and forestry productivity) were
the result of theoretical models that led to
an overestimate of the favourable
influence of carbon fertilisation intensity
on agricultural yields. Full scale
experiments and consideration of other
limiting factors have recently produced
values reducing by half the initial
theoretical evaluations2 and at the same
time have noted inversion phenomena
which appeared as soon as temperatures
rose significantly, i.e., when temperature
increase stands higher than a current
range of variation, productivity of existing
biomass is decreasing because
environmental conditions depart from the
biological optimum.
Another point is that various types of
damage would not only have a single
effect but would also interact with each
other. This compounding of impacts can
considerably amplify the economic
effects and the global impact on welfare:
water cycle disruption, health aspects,
reduced agricultural production and
repetitive extreme events could all
combine to become serious obstacles to
development, in particular by
overwhelming the capacity for adaptation
which could a priori be available in the
case of partial and limited stress.
Damages will mainly be felt in the long
term, beginning after 2050 and with more
intensity after 2100 particularly, but will
then become very long-lasting3. The
differences in damages measured as a
percentage of a Gross World Product
(GWP), itself progressing with time,
would be 1 to 4 between 2060 and 2100, 1 to 25 between 2060
and 2200 for the more severe scenario (high climate
sensitivity, extreme events, non-market-impacts) (see figure
4). Climate is a very long term problem with roots in the past
and present and involves a major time lag between the
moment when something happens (GHG emissions) and the
moment when the effects are registered. People living in
industrialised countries and indifferent to the fate of
humankind after 2050 do not really need to worry overmuch
about climate change.
28
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FIGURE 2: Stabilisation levels and probability ranges for temperature increases.
The top panel shows the range of temperatures projected at stabilisation of concentration
levels between 400 ppm and 750 ppm CO2e at long run equilibrium. The solid horizontal
lines indicate the 5 - 95% probability range based on climate sensitivity estimates from the
IPCC 2001 and a recent Hadley Centre overall study. The vertical stroke indicates the mean
of the 50th percentile point. The dashed horizontal lines show the 5 - 95% range based on
eleven recent studies. The bottom panel illustrates the range of impacts expected at
different levels of warming. From Figure 13.4 (SR, p. 294) 
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Damages will be very unevenly distributed over the planet: the
rise in temperature will be felt faster and much more strongly
over land than over oceans, at higher latitudes than in the
tropics; existing geographic disparities in rainfall distribution will
be accentuated, the sub-tropical areas will be the worst hit by
drought (Mediterranean-Sahel zone, South Africa) as will South-
East Asia; with a 2° rise in temperature, these sub-tropical areas
could lose as much as 30% in rainfall volumes (Table 3.1, SR,
p.57). In total, damage estimated for Africa, the Middle East,
India and South-East Asia would total more than twice the mean
global GDP loss percentage in 2100 (SR, p. 158).
Depending on the temperature level reached, uncertainty is
growing as regards the spectrum of possible physical,
environmental, economic and social events: we know rather
little about the way in which the world would live at 4°C higher
than the present level, to say nothing of the case of a
temperature increase greater than 10°C. That is the reason
why the economics of risk and uncertainty are such a pivotal
part of the evaluation proposed by the Stern Review.
3.2. DISASTROUS CLIMATE CHANGE IS IN NO WAY
UNAVOIDABLE AND PREVENTION IS POSSIBLE AT A MOD-
ERATE COST
Despite the very alarming picture of possible damages and
daunting surprises which would arise from climate change,
global disaster is in no way inevitable. An international policy
to control the climate problem is technically and economically
possible. It does however depend on whether the
international community adopts the appropriate objectives
and on how fast strong policies can be implemented. In line
with a long term stabilisation objective of 550 ppm CO2e
concentrations, which appears to be the long term target that
should not be transgressed according to the Stern Review, a
level of global emissions by 2050 25% below current levels
would be achievable for a not insignificant but still affordable
annual cost estimated as contained in the range of -3%
(positive impact on growth) to +3% of GWP (pessimistic
scenario ignoring all the cost-lowering factors of existing
techniques and already advantageous opportunities)4. The
Stern Review adopts a central value of + 1% of GWP, i.e. a cost
approximating $1000bn by 2050. At that concentration–550
ppm CO2e–the cost of residual climate damages would be
equivalent to an annual and irreversible loss of 1.1% of
consumption per head. This means that the total cost of
climate change (cost of damages and cost of prevention)
would be equivalent to a little over 2% of consumption per
head, now and forever after.
Keeping prevention costs reasonably low depends on several
factors:
- that action be implemented by most countries representing
the largest share of GHG emissions;
- that strong policies be implemented without delay, in
particular those which have an impact on technical
innovation, so that emission pathways could begin to fall
significantly by the next 10-20 years. Peak emissions
worldwide should be reached by 2020 at the latest and net
total emissions should then begin to diminish at an annual
rate of 1 to 3%. Any delay in implementing policies would lead
not only to rapidly dwindling chances of achieving the goal,
and therefore greater threats to world climate, but also to
being forced into taking subsequently more drastic and costly
action within a shorter time. For instance, deferring peak
global emissions from 2020 to 2030 would mean accelerating
twofold the later rate of decline of emissions required to reach
stabilisation at 550 ppm of CO2e;
- that policies be adopted which use, as required, the entire
range of instruments for action so as to affect all sectors,
but giving priority to instruments which assign a price to
GHG emissions. The idea would be to combine firm overall
commitment to quantitative goals with flexibility in sectoral
and local implementation of policies so as to minimise cost.
Particular attention should be given to the choice of efficient
strategies for recycling the revenues of carbon taxes or
auctioned tradable permits. The Stern Review pleads in
favour of a two-pronged approach: achieving a global carbon
29
FIGURE 4: The impacts of climate change
Extract from Figure 6.5d, (SR, p. 157): the shaded surface
indicates the values for a 5 - 95% range of probability.
FIGURE 3: Global mean temperature increase as a function of
GHG concentration level. The middle, black line represents the
‘best estimate’ of climate sensitivity of 3°C. Climate sensitivity is
defined as the global mean equilibrium temperature induced by a
doubling of CO2 atmospheric concentration. The coloured bands
reflect various stabilization scenarios designed for different 
targets. Extract from p. 42 of Technical Summary of IPCC WGIII
Fourth assessment Report (2007)
3 According to calculations made by G. Yohe (2006), with the pure preference rate for the present chosen by the Stern Review Team (0,1%), damages posterior to 2200 
should double the total damage attributed to climate change until 2200. 
4 The baseline scenario would lead to a doubling of GHGs emissions between 2030 and 2060.
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price through quota trading or taxation so as to coordinate
the whole process of adjustment efficiently and
implementing a policy to foster technical progress and
innovation (R&D programmes, technical cooperation,
technology transfers, technical progress induced by price
signals). The challenge is such that only a combination of
these two strategies could rise to the occasion. See figure 5,
possible distribution of reductions to be obtained by
technology. Technological advances are expected to halve
the mean cost of abatement by 2025. See also table 1 for the
main macro-economic components of gains to be expected
through specific directions of cost-abating policy measures,
assessed as a percentage of GDP.
Table 1 highlights the key role played, as regards costs, by
four variables: recycling strategies for the tax revenues from
policy instruments, induced technological progress,
ancillary environmental benefits (excluding climate change)
as a result, for example, of reduced impacts on health due
to car pollution and coal-fuelled urban heating, and the
existence of international flexibility mechanisms.
Altogether, economic growth and development would be
more jeopardised by a business-as-usual (BAU) policy
ignoring the climatic threat than by a policy for the control of
the climate risk with long term stabilisation within the 450-
550 ppm of CO2e range—which for CO2 alone represents a
bracket of 390-500 ppm—as its objective.
3.3. OTHER PRIORITIES TO ADOPT AND ILLUSIONS TO DISPEL
In the short term, taking into account the high inertia of
energy systems due to the long life of equipment and
infrastructures, an essential point is to prevent new
investments from confining mankind in high carbon emission
profile technologies for several more decades. The
development pattern of emerging countries is of course a
prime concern, with the issue of coal-fuelled power stations.
If new investments in energy production, not forgetting
infrastructures and buildings, were to be an occasion for
adopting low-profile CO2 technologies, an annual gain of 6
GtCO2e could be obtained by 2030 at practically no extra cost!
Policies to be implemented must beware of two pitfalls: on
the one hand unrealistic determination regarding objectives;
on the other, deferring any significant action until happier
technological circumstances prevail. 
In fact, setting a mandatory objective, with no leeway, for long
term stabilisation of GHG concentration at 450 ppm of CO2e,
would probably be very costly since it would signify managing
after a very early peak, by 2010, to reduce emissions by 7% a
year, so as to arrive at emissions two thirds lower than current
levels by 2050 (SR, p. 201). Nevertheless, that is the objective
which would be required as a central value to avoid a long term
rise in temperature of over 2°C. The rate of reduction would be
30
FIGURE 5: The distribution of emission savings 
by technological advance by 2025
(SR, p. 230) CCS is for Carbon Capture and Sequestration;
DCHP is for Decentralised power generation, including 
micro-generation, combined Heat and Power
TABLE 1: The main sources of gain from prevention costs
Worst case assumptions                                        -3.4
Sources of gain Active revenue recycling   1.9
CGE model 1.5
Induced technology 1.3
Non-climate benefit 1.0
International mechanisms 0.7
‘Backstop’ technology 0.6
Climate benefit 0.2
Total extra assumptions on sources of gain 7.3
Best-case assumptions +3.9
Meta-analysis estimates: average impact of model
assumptions on World Gross Product in 2030 for
stabilisation at 450 ppm CO2 (approximately 500-550 ppm
CO2e). The baseline outcome results from worst case
assumptions. On top of this, the analysis considers
additional assumptions that mitigate the worst case
assumptions. Their effects are supposed to be additive.
Taking account of all extra-assumptions, adding their
effects on the worst case, leads to the best case estimate:
the loss of output associated with the worst case is
possibly substituted by a gain of output in the best case.
(% point levels difference from base model run).
Source: Table 10.1 (SR p. 243, extracted from Barker et al. 2006)
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halved if the pathway was allowed to reach a 500 ppm level at
one point on the way to long term stabilisation at 450 ppm. But
this would imply that for over a century, temperatures and
risks would be those associated with the 500 ppm level. For
temperatures, that would be 0.5°C more between 2030 and
2150 for the same final stabilisation goal. 
It would however be totally unrealistic to wait for major
technology breakthroughs to start implementing strong
policies for emission control: the problem will be solved
through multiple innovations, many of them incremental, and
by changed life-styles and economic incentives. The time
limits for mitigation policies to be relevant means mankind
cannot afford to wait several decades for hypothetical major
technological breakthroughs to come on stream. 
It would be just as unrealistic to pin one's hopes on the notion
that our descendants will manage to adapt fully to the new
climate situation: business-as-usual would lead to
temperature levels and biophysical disturbances of such
magnitude that the process of adaptation, which will be
necessary anyway regardless of the climate control strategy
adopted, could not obviate considerable and irreversible
damages. In other words, transferring the whole burden of
compulsory adaptation to future generations is ethically
unacceptable (see the discussion in section 6). 
One final illusion would be to consider that a project approach
(similar to the JI/CDM in the Kyoto Protocol) would be
sufficient for all countries worldwide to join forces in the fight
against climate change. This approach is not adequate for the
purpose and would not be sufficient to put humankind as a
whole on the right path. The world needs overall
management of large financial flows connected to the carbon
constraint aimed at developing and emerging countries . In
this framework, which remains to be developed, specific
mechanisms could be found for certain countries5 or sectors.
For example, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
could be extended to policies, programmes and projects in
the least developed countries border adjustment
mechanisms could be implemented for interim periods in
countries which, having adopted ambitious quantified
objectives for reducing emissions in sectors such as cement
and aluminium, are exposed to asymmetric competition from
manufacturers not subject to such constraints. 
4. SOME RELEVANT DATA AND INSIGHTS
The Stern Review contains a large amount of more or less
specific information and data selected from worldwide
scientific literature. This is a key element giving this report
its value. Some are listed below. 
4.1. ON GHG EMISSIONS AND CONCENTRATIONS
In 2000, GHG emissions were attributable to energy for 65%
and to non-energy sources for 35% (see Figure 6 from WRI,
2006). Energy sources have displayed the highest growth
rates: +3% annually for energy-related CO2 during the 1950-
2002 period, with a lower rate since the eighties. Between
1990 and 2000, the average annual rate of growth of non-
CO2 GHGs was 0.5% and of all GHGs together 1.2% (SR, p.
175). These differences are likely to persist in the future. 
(from SR, p. 171)
The average annual increase in atmospheric concentration of
the 6 GHGs considered by the Kyoto protocol since 1980 is
around 2-3 ppm and the mean temperature rise has been
0.2° C per decade. But this is accelerating: in 2000, the annual
increase was 2.7 ppm (SR, p. 169). With a BAU scenario, the
annual rate would be 4.5 ppm by 2035. If energy-related CO2
emission increases are assigned to a few major macro-
economic variables, the result is that increased income is the
cause of 1.9% of emission growth, but this is offset by an
equivalent reduction of carbon and energy intensities. The
rate of population increase (1.4%) is in fact roughly equivalent
to net emission increase (SR, p. 178). 
Three quarters of energy-related GHG emission increases by
2030 will be produced by developing or emerging countries.
Even if industrialised countries (countries in Annex 1 to Kyoto
protocol) were able to reduce their emissions to zero by 2050,
the rest of the world would still have to reduce emissions by
40% compared to the reference (BAU) scenario to achieve
550pppm of CO2e concentration (SR, p. 206). 
Stabilisation of the current GHG concentration (430 ppm of
CO2e) would lead, at equilibrium, to a temperature increase
of 1 to 3°C, if aerosols did not minimize the impact. There is
still a one-in-five chance that temperatures rise by over 3°C
at that level.
Maintaining 2000 GHG emission levels would lead to a 550
ppm concentration around 2050 and 650 ppm by 2100 (SR, p.
170). At the end of this century, the earth could reach
temperatures unprecedented for three million years. The
outcome of an absence of GHG policy would be a significant
increase in emission levels: BAU implies reaching 550 ppm
around 2035 (SR, p. 169).
4.2. THE IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
Sea levels rise much more slowly than temperatures, but
will continue to do so over a long period (between 10 and 88
cm by 2100). However, by around 2050 sea-water flooding
and coastal protection could become a problem in South-
East Asia, small islands and many conurbations: Tokyo,
Shanghai, Hong Kong, Calcutta, Karachi, Buenos Aires,
London, New York, etc. (SR, p. 76).
From one study (Thomas et al. (2004), a temperature increase
of 1 to 2° C, if it occurred in a short time, could be sufficient to
cause the extinction of 15 to 40% of natural species because
of the loss of areas having suitable conditions of living for the
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5 If developed countries accepted a goal of 90% abatement of GHGs by 2050 on 1990 levels and achieve 50% of the needed investment by helping LDCs to control their own 
emissions, it would involve annual financial flows of investment of $40 Billion to the latter (SR, p. 460).
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concerned species (SR, p. 80). Nature reserves could
progressively experience climates much less favourable to
the species they are supposed to be preserving.
Melting glaciers could increase the risk of flooding during
the wet season and increase dry season water shortages for
one sixth of the global population (Indian sub-continent,
parts of China, the Andes in South America). Water reserves
for the dry season provided by the Himalayan glaciers might
suffer a two-thirds reduction by 2050 (SR, p. 104). And yet, in
2000 over 200 million people were living in floodplains.
The likelihood of suddenly changing regional weather
patterns in certain areas will increase with time, in
particular as regards the monsoon in Asia and El Nino in
Latin America. Climate change will also involve greater
seasonal and annual variations, without the various types of
excesses (droughts and floods) offsetting each other. An
increase in frequency by a factor of 10 of these extreme
situations is to be expected for a 3°C rise in temperature.
From Munich Re estimates, the heat wave in Europe in 2003
killed at least 35,000 people and generated agricultural
losses worth $15bn (SR, p. 132). By about 2050, extreme
climate events could inflict annual damages of between 0.5
and 1% of GWP (SR, p. 132). In 2005, another exceptional
year, damages already totalled some 0.3% of GWP. The cost
of flooding in the United Kingdom could increase threefold
and reach approximately 0.3% of GDP in 2050 (SR, p. 133).
An indirect effect could be the growing difficulty in insuring
certain assets because of their location (coastal areas,
regions vulnerable to flooding, etc.), which would reduce
possibilities of adaptation.
In areas affected by reduced rainfall such as California,
hydroelectric production could be cut by 30% in the event of
a 4°C temperature rise (SR, p. 126).
Climate change will radically modify food production
because of interacting factors: the extinction of species
essential for the ecology of agrosystems (pollination, etc.);
the increased frequency of floods and droughts; more
extensive fires in forests and crops; the development of
crop-destroying pests; increased tropospheric ozone with a
negative influence on crop yields.
The fall in agricultural income and the effects on health of a
deteriorating environment will inhibit agricultural
productivity (preference for less risky crops in spite of lower
productivity), investment and the dissemination of effective
techniques. In a number of cases, disinvestment (selling of
assets to cope with survival problems) will ensue and the
poverty trap will persist, not to mention pressure on public
resources (lower tax revenues, extra fiscal expenditures).
The solvency of people concerned will be affected as will
their capacity to meet their essential needs through trade. It
will be more difficult to meet development goals analogous
to those of the Millennium.
In proportion, damages generated by climate change will
affect the developing countries welfare much more than
industrialised countries because of four factors: their
geographic location; their strong dependence on
agriculture; their higher vulnerability to lack of resources;
their low rate of insurance (under 1% of losses due to
natural disasters from 1985 to 1999 were insured in low-
income countries) (SR, p. 99). For a 2-3°C increase in
temperature, the extra number of people exposed to famine
could be as high as 30 to 200 million. As a result, since
developing countries will be those experiencing the greatest
difficulties in adapting, large transfers from industrialised
countries will be required to achieve the same development
goals as in a no-climate change scenario.
Climate change tends to amplify disparities between rich
and poor regions as regards health. Since 1970, according to
the World Health Organisation (WHO), due to increased
mean temperature and more frequent and severe heat
waves, climate change is already responsible for over
150,000 deaths each year through increasing incidence of
diarrhoea, malaria and malnutrition, predominantly in
Africa and other developing regions. 6Just a 1°C increase in
32
FIGURE 7: Comparison of stabilisation and BAU scenarios
This figure indicates the magnitude of reductions to achieve 
by comparison with the BAU scenario. (from SR, p. 206)
FIGURE 6: GHG emissions per source in 2000
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global temperature above pre-industrial could double
annual deaths from climate change to at least 300,000 and
this to happen by 2030 (SR, p.75). 
By 2050, there could be as many as 200 million additional
permanently displaced persons due to climate upheavals (SR,
p. 56); in 2000, climate refugees were as numerous as those
fleeing political and religious persecution or ethnic conflicts.
The combination of these physical and economic changes
will probably lead to tourist flows being modified, with as a
result, significant loss of income for some regions and gains
in others. This will in turn lead to new investment flows in
tourist industry infrastructures.
4.3. POLICIES TO COMBAT CLIMATE CHANGE
The cost of energy represents on average less than 5% of the
variable costs of production activities, and 3% in the UK (SR, p. 255). 
In the case of the United Kingdom, if emission reduction
were to cost on average 30euros/tCO2, this would represent
an overall increase of 1% in consumer prices (SR, p. 256).
The economic impact would be equivalent to an 11 dollars
increase per barrel of crude oil.
A complete halt to deforestation, which currently represents
20% of total GHG emissions, could be achieved for an
average cost of no more than $5/tCO2 and even possibly $2
(SR, p. 217). Difficulties would be institutional and political
(rule of law, incentives).
In 2005 waste produced 1.4 GtCO2e of emissions annually,
half of which was due to landfill and the rest to waste water
treatment. Programmes for diminishing the flow of waste
through recycling and reuse should reduce emissions
significantly. By 2020, according to the IPCC, 0.7 GtCO2e
could be avoided, of which three quarters at negative cost
and the remaining at an average cost of less than $5 per
tonne of CO2e (SR, p. 218).
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) should play a decisive
role in reducing emissions. The IPCC special report on CCS
suggested it would provide between 15% and 55% of the
cumulative mitigation effort up to 2100 (SR, p. 525). If all new
thermal power stations (coal-, gas- and fuel oil- fired) were
equipped with CCS, global emissions could be reduced every
year by 17 GtCO2. In this way, 46 ppm would be saved each
year by 2050 (SR, p. 223).
Emission gains obtained through substituting biofuels for fossil
fuels vary considerably (10 to 90%) depending on the resources
and systems used. Systems with the most potential would be
those using lignocellulose materials. Two to three GtCO2e
per year in 2050 could be saved at a cost of under $25/tCO2e.
Including the six Kyoto Protocol GHGs instead of focusing on CO2
alone can reduce the cost of a given objective of medium term
reduction (2030) by 30 to 40% (SR, p. 245). In the longer term, the
effect is lessened because of the much shorter life of some
GHGs (CH4).
Globally, energy subsidies in 2005 amounted to $250bn, of which
90 for oil and over 50 for coal (SR, p. 269, 278) This is
approximately the same amount as the extra annual investment
budget needed to implement a strong policy for the prevention
of climate risk by 2030.
If instead of accepting an average cost of 1% of their GDP, the
20% richest countries benefiting from 80% of global revenues,
were willing to pay an additional 20% to reach 1.2% of their GDP,
the remaining 80% of the world population could pay only 0.2%
of their GDP. By 2050, that would represent an annual transfer
of $200bn (SR, p. 259). 
5. TWO ADDITIONAL COMMENTS ON CLIMATE
POLICIES
The type of action best suited to deal with climate problems, as
regards the theory of risk (effect of uncertainty concerning
damage functions and abatement costs on the best choice of
instruments, by price –carbon tax- or by quantity –emissions
caps-) is a combination of two components: in the long term,
what is needed is quantitative objectives defined as atmospheric
GHG concentrations whereas in the short and medium term,
priority has to be given to flexibility and economic efficiency.
Quota trading or taxation is therefore required to adjust
pathways to the long term objective in a flexible manner.
In spite of appearances, the problem of adapting to climate
change has some features of public goods (action benefits not
solely enjoyed by the investor). This is true in particular for
scientific research and the dissemination of information on
possible techniques, but also for land use planning and
insurance schemes. Both national and international policies are
therefore required to support adaptation, even though an
important portion of adaptation is the result of personal,
corporate or local authority commitment.
6. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CRITICAL DEBATE
TRIGGERED BY THE STERN REVIEW 
6.1. A MIXED RECEPTION
Even before publication, the Stern Review was the subject of
divergent appraisals which became even more heated after it
was released. It received the solemn validation of the British
Prime Minister and was also the subject of extensive media and
political attention. It modified the spirit of the Conference of the
Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change,
held in Nairobi in November 2006, although it failed to lead to the
adoption of a timetable for the setting up of a post-Kyoto
international organisation. It was welcomed by four Nobel prize
33
6 Such estimates are taken from Patz and al., (2005). 
O. GODARD CLIMATE CHANGE: A SURVEY OF THE STERN REVIEW
laureates in Economics (James Mirrlees, Amartya Sen, Robert
Solow, Joseph Stiglitz), by other economists (John Quiggin,
Claude Henry, inter alia), by economic experts on climate
change, such as Michael Grubb (Cambridge University and
Carbon Trust in the United Kingdom) and by other international
personalities. Other economists formulated critical comment.
Some expressed their reservations in moderate tones (David
Maddison, Henry D. Jacoby, et al.) whereas others adopted a
more severe view on crucial points such as discounting (Partha
Dasgupta, William Nordhaus, Martin Weitzman, Gary Yohe,) and
some responses were even violently hostile (Richard Tol) (see
Box 5). Criticisms by climatologists (Richard Lindzen, Fred
Singer and other climate change skeptics. See Box 6) and
personalities standing at the border of science, ideology and
politics, such as Bjorn Lomborg (2006), should also be
mentioned, as should the editorial writers in magazines7.
The Stern Review did not arrive on completely virgin ground as
regards economic studies on climate change. Some
economists, such as William Nordhaus, have been working on
the subject since the mid 1970s8 and many energy economists
have invested that field since the early nineties. In so far as the
Stern Review's message contradicts quite radically the
hierarchy of costs and recommendations proposed by many
economists, it is only to be expected that it attracts careful
scrutiny and criticism.
BOX 5 – An example of the tone of harsh criticism by a climate
economist, Richard Tol
Richard Tol is professor in Hambourg, Vrije and Carnegie Mellon
universities and militates in favor of strategies for adaptation to
climate change. He wrote in November 2006: “The Stern Review
is very selective in the studies it quotes on the impacts of climate
change. The selection bias is not random, but emphasizes the
most pessimistic studies. The discount rate used is lower than
the official recommendations by HM Treasury. Results are
occasionally misinterpreted. The report claims that a cost-
benefit analysis was done, but none was carried out. The Stern
Review can therefore be dismissed as alarmist and
incompetent. (…) unsound analyses like the Stern Review only
provide fodder for those skeptical of climate change and climate
policy.” In an interview on the BBC (Radio 4) on January 26, 2007,
he was even more devastating: "There is a whole range of very
basic economics mistakes that somebody who claims to be a
Professor of Economics simply should not make. (…) If a student
of mine were to hand in this report as a Master thesis, perhaps
if I were in a good mood I would give him a 'D' for diligence; but
more likely I would give him an 'F' for fail."
BOX 6 – Climatologists who severely criticize the Stern
Review are those skeptic scientists denying human-made
climate change 
Most climatologists dismissing the scientific basis of the
Stern Review are also on the list of signatories of an appeal
addressed to the Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper in
April 2006, asking him not to commit to a climate policy, said
to be irrational and dramatically costly. Claiming that involving
human responsibility in the climate issue has no scientific
base, the 60 scientists who signed this letter were asking
Harper to organize a broad contradictory public debate on the
scientific foundations of the Kyoto Protocol. See I. Clark et al.,
(2006). They were almost immediately contradicted by other
letters from 80 scientists and by the Canadian Society of
Meteorology and Oceanography and its 800 members
reaffirming their trust in IPCC expertise (Woodbury, 2006). 
The criticisms vary, but on the whole, address the modelling
part of the Review, although the Stern Review Team stated
that they considered the exercise as additional to the
empirical description of damages incurred and not to be
taken at face value. The most acerbic criticisms are based
either on an overly hasty perusal of the Review, or on
excessive attention given to a few discrepancies and
methodological approximations or else—and this is
paradoxical in the light of the tone of some critics— on an
incorrect appreciation of the meaning of the economic
concepts (when critics disregard the specific context in which
concepts and tools are relevant and oversestimate the
general scientific value of specific assumptions), or on
fundamental points of disagreement more related to ethics
than to economics.
6.2. THREE MAIN LINES OF ECONOMIC CRITICISM
Critical comment was mostly focused on three main themes:
1) the Stern Review Team used the scientific literature
selectively and the bias systematically favoured the worst case
scenario; 2) they made technical errors (counting risks twice
over, refusing to take into consideration the considerable
attenuation of net damages obtainable via adaptation
strategies, forgetting some of the economic costs of prevention
policies, discrepancies between the damages as described
and economic growth assumptions, in Africa in particular,
etc.); 3) they manipulated the economic concepts and tools, in
particular the discount rate, so as to paint the most alarming
picture of expected damages if the international community
failed to take early energetic action.
In the following, I am going to report the debates but also give
my own arguments and viewpoint. My general assessment is
that if the conclusions of the Stern Review are, on the whole,
right, but sometimes for the wrong reasons as said by
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7 See the list of critiques of the Stern Review in the “references” section. 
8 See for instance W. Nordhaus (1977).
9 It has been shown by Henry and Henry (2002) that it would be irrational for decision-makers to consider only the data for which a determined probability distribution exists.    
Ambiguous scientific data, in Ellsberg’s terms (1961), implying only probability ranges or imprecise probabilities for some events or states of the world, also have to 
be considered for devising a more enlightened and rational policy.
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Weitzman (2007) and Yohe, Tol and Murphy (2007), the
harshest criticisms are wrong or disputable because they are
based on bad or disputable arguments.
The first line of criticism displays a misunderstanding of the
Stern Review approach, which is based on risk and uncertainty
economics. In this approach, close attention must be paid to
assumptions which may be seen as rather extreme but can
muster a sufficient degree of scientific consideration even if
they are not yet "certified" or validated9. Unlike a number of
previous reports, the Stern Review is not restricted to average
values and "best guesses" and explicitly refers to the rationale
of the precautionary principle, although the latter is not
formally entered in the modeling. As a matter of fact most
previous economic work has been considering scenarios
implying an expected temperature increase of 3 °C and few
have systematically explored the implications of the global
climate erring in much higher values. This is a matter of
attitudes10, but also of work in progress of climatologists and
economists since 200111. The Stern Review is rightly
considering a broader scope of possible climate evolutions and
gives an explicit formal treatment to the possibility of more
frequent and intense extreme events. All this has been
integrated in the probabilistic approach of the PAGE 2002 IAM
with the help of Monte-Carlo simulations, which most other
models do not provide.
Investigating the second line of criticism would lead to
technical discussions which are beyond the scope of this
survey. Some of the points are of secondary importance.
Others express disagreement with the framework chosen for
the Stern Review. This is the case for adaptation, which
deserves a detailed discussion (see below). 
For several economists, the gist of the situation as described
by the Stern Review is to be attributed to an excessively low
discount rate which they see as unjustifiable because it is out
of phase with empirical observations on current attitudes to
saving and risks on capital markets. As a result, the
recommendations (immediate action on emission trajectories
so as to trigger a global downturn of emissions before 2020 in
order to avoid exceeding a long term concentration of 550pm
of CO2e) are considered unrealistic and devoid of any rational
basis in the light of the disproportionate economic costs
involved12 . Let us begin by considering this case on
discounting.
6.3. THE KEY ROLE OF THE SOCIAL DISCOUNT RATE
Martin Weitzman (2007a) begins his review of the Stern
Review by stating that, by instinct, most economists would
choose a triple 2 for determining the proper value of the
discount rate: δ=2, η=2, g=2, which gives r= 6%. The Stern
Review adopted respective values of δ=0.1, η=1, g~1.3, which
gives around 1.4% for r. Was this low discount rate
unreasonable and ungrounded? Certain analysts
(Nordhaus, Weitzman, Tol, Yohe…) reason as though the
object was to set a rate applicable to investment projects to
be made in the near future, so that they then refer to current
terms on the capital market or to attitudes to savings in
order to argue against the Stern Review approach. On this
basis Nordhaus suggests δ=3 as a proper value for the pure
time preference. But the Review is totally explicit about the
reasons why its authors think this line of reasoning is not
appropriate to examine a global problem such as climate
change for a time span extending to 2200 and in fact well
beyond. Their choice for the value of this variable ∂ is
grounded in an ethical postulate: the utility of each human
being should be treated the same way independently from
time and geographical contingencies. As Thomas Schelling
(1995) put it, the usual justification of the pure time
preference -the psychological notion of impatience- does
not make sense when the issue at stake is the future of the
planet’s climate in centuries: we feel no impatience when
considering possible transfers of wealth between year 2100
and year 2166… However Schelling supported a mixed
ethical position acknowledging legitimacy to an unequal
willingness of people to redistributing income to unequally
distant people by time and geography, what he called
“depreciation”, quite a different ethical basis from the Stern
Review for making decisions.
In parallel the well-known Cambridge economist Partha
Dasgupta (2006), in his own review, accepts the ethical
position of the Stern Review for δ, but criticizes the value of
η, that he thinks should have been increased by a factor
between 2 and 4. This proposal would imply a greatly
increased social willingness to redistribute wealth from rich
to poor, and subsequently limit the transfer from the present
towards the future, supposed to be wealthier. With a factor 2
for instance it would be justified to take 100 from the rich if it
allows to increase the income of people 10 times less wealthy
by only 1. It is hard to see how such transfers can be grounded
on the observation of real practice in contemporary societies,
which is the rationale of Nordhaus and his likes. Meanwhile
both Nordhaus and Dasgupta converge to support a discount
rate of about 4.5%. But the Dasgupta’s position is different in
trying to reconcile economic realism, like Nordhaus, with
formal coherence in the theory of discounting and a normative
view favouring the poorest of the present generations.
The problem of coherence raised by Dasgupta is the following:
in a very simplified model assuming that growth is the
exclusive outcome of capital investment and the social rate of
return on investment is 4%, with the values ∂ and η of the
Stern Review, the rate of savings should be tremendous,
reaching 97.5% of present income, which is by no means
realistic and acceptable. Although impressive, the argument
35
10 It is only recently that the issue of how to treat extreme values by statistical models and cost-benefit analyses has been raised, thanks to Tol (2003) and Weitzman (2007a and b).
11 If we can find few early attempts to take account of possible catastrophic events in Integrated Assessment Models, they have been modelled as economic events, 
not firstly as physical events, as pointed out by Wright and Erickson (2003).
12 Wanting to avoid huge short term costs, Yohe, Tol and Murphy (2007) propose that policies to be framed on the basis of a carbon value not exceeding $15 per CO2 ton 
in the short term and increasing at the interest rate to reach $30 by 2020.
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is not quite convincing since this reductio ad absurdum begs
the question: there is a discrepancy between the assumption
of the Stern Review of a long term per capita rate of growth of
1.3% and a social rate of return on investment of 4% and, as
pointed out by Delong (2006), the model used is also
disputable since it ignores technical progress, the most
important source of growth in the real economy. By injecting
technical progress in the same simplified model, Delong
shows that it is possible to reconcile the values of the Stern
Review with a reasonable rate of savings (around 22%) asked
for to present generations.
By crossing criticisms and proposals of Dasgupta and
Nordhaus, the choices of the Stern Review paradoxically
emerged as rather sound, while, at the same time, they raise
considerable issues about the legitimate conditions for
making collective ethical choices. Whatever ethical judgment
is made on the weighting of the welfare of generations in the
distant future, along the lines of Schelling or those of the
Stern Review or yet other ones13, it cannot be deduced from
the manner in which our contemporaries organise their
private affairs—saving more or less of their income or buying
more or less insurance policies. There are several reasons for
that. The most evident one is that individual life horizon and
the horizon of mankind do not coincide: choices framed by the
first one cannot have precedence when issues pertinent to the
second are raised. The second reason is a case of market
incompleteness: generations alive today cannot avail
themselves of economic mechanisms to reveal their well-
considered ethical preferences after giving due consideration
to their vision of mankind in the future and how best to deal
with a world a large part of which does not take part in the
market goods universe. The standard situations of economic
choice put forward by tenants of realism do not fit the framing
of choices imposed by the climate change issue. They make a
mistake against reality.
The basis of positions of Nordhaus or Tol (2006) calling for a
realistic approach of social preferences could only be justified by
making two ethical assumptions: first, ethical choices are
exclusively a private affair, even for determining the fate of global
public goods, and the coherence of individual preferences in
privacy makes it possible to extrapolate from ordinary consumer
choices to reveal what individual ethical preferences are
regarding long run climate issues; second, public choices have
to mimic private consumer preferences. Both assumptions, to
my view, express a badly understood moral individualism. When
the destiny of the human community is at stake, ethical choices
have to be placed in the sphere of public deliberation and framed
by the moral values crystallized in fundamental law references
and institutions. Let us take from Mark Sagoff (1988) the idea
that it is a mistake in the use of concepts to confuse the
determination of consumer preferences in privacy and that of
preferences of citizens in the public arena, though in both cases
individuals are invited to form and express a judgment. We know
from the work of Michael Walzer (1983) and Luc Boltanski and
Laurent Thevenot (2006) that, in Western democracies, several
principles of justification coexist, which put in order different
parts of our social lives and from which are derived ordinary
norms of justice. It is critical not to confuse all of them, as is
unhappily frequently done by economists seeing the attention
they give to consumer preferences on the market as the highest
expression of their attachment to democracy and rationality.
The position adopted by the Stern Review, that is granting the
same weight to the utility of any individual irrespective of date
of birth, is as orthodox as it is possible to be from the viewpoint
of utilitarian philosophy which is the matrix of welfare
economics that Stern, Nordhaus, Dasgupta, Tol and other
have adopted for normative purposes. The fact that this does
not reflect current choices in a society engrossed in present-
day issues is irrelevant since it only confirms the radical
distinction between positive and normative worlds. What
would be the point of taking observed current behaviours as a
foundation of normative choices for the global future since
those behaviours are, on the aggregate level, radically
unsustainable and we14 want a sustainable future?
Clearly, discounting is the chink in the armour of any
economic approach involving decisions with effects extending
into the very distant future. A technical criticism that can
indeed be made of the Stern Review is that it chose to allow a
single variable to synthesize four different types of
considerations in one aggregate value: subjective treatment
of risk for oneself (threat to one’s own life or one’s income),
attitude to wealth inequalities (from rich to poor or the
reverse), inter-generational ethical standards of equity and,
last but not least, long term preferences between producible
and non-producible goods (natural resources and life
supporting ecological systems). The Stern Review Team in
their reflections of February 12, 2007 in fact acknowledged the
difficulties of having to take account too many dimensions to
determine the value of a single variable. Although all
modelling exercises need the use of tractable formalisms and
involve compact formulations of concepts, future work should
try and disentangle these various aspects.
Let us focus on the fourth variable. Strictly speaking, to give
acceptable results, a given discount rate has to be applied to
a basket of goods and services assessed with a correct
structure of relative prices. When the economy is made of
two types of goods, those producible by human activity and
those non-producible extracted from the environment, we
know that the relative prices of non-producible goods
should progressively increase over time because of their
growing scarcity –less supply for more demand. In a perfect
market economy, the rate of increase of prices of non-
producible goods should equate the interest rate paid on the
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13 Nordhaus (2007) rightly underlines there is no unique commonly accepted ethical framing for making decisions touching intergenerational justice. See for instance 
Dobson (1999), Page (2006), Tremmel (2006).
14 One criticism against the Stern Review is that its assessment was arbitrarily based on personal ethical positions of the authors, not on due attention to preferences of the people. 
This criticism is not technically acceptable and is based on confusion, as shown earlier. But wanting a sustainable future for mankind is no more a matter of personal taste, since
it has been acknowledged by many international conventions and national legal systems. For instance, in France, a constitutional text –the Environmental Charter- obliges 
public policies to target a sustainable development.
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capital market. Although this focus on changing patterns of
relative prices, which generalized the Hotelling’s rule for
depletable natural resources, was established in a general
equilibrium framework for a decentralized-disaggregated
economy with n goods by Edmond Malinvaud in 195315, then
emphasised thirty years ago by Marcel Boiteux (1976), and
sometimes acknowledged in public economic guidelines16,
most applied economic analyses do not take an explicit
account of this structural shift of prices. It is the case of
aggregate optimisation models of climate change policies
that stick to a more tractable framework of aggregate
output and consumption and an overall per capita rate of
consumption growth, instead of introducing at least a two-
sector representation of the economy. In practice, this
comes back to considering the output structure and relative
prices as unchanged through time. 
Quite surprisingly this issue has not been raised by the most
eminent Stern Review critics who have reasoned only on the
basis of an aggregated consumption or gross product flow
without pointing out the shift of long term relative prices to
reflect an asymmetrical evolution of affluence: increased
scarcity in one side and increased affluence in terms of private
goods in the other side. Although the Stern Review is
dedicated to an assessment of possible evolutions of critical
environmental conditions, the discussion by critics were put in
terms considering as self-evident that future generations will
be much wealthier on the whole than present ones. It is true
that the Stern Review itself adopted such a framing, which
coherently leads to the conclusion that serious mitigation
policies are the best means to preserve long term growth.
However as Roger Guesnerie (2004, 2007) puts it in his
comments of his own two-sector model addressing this
issue: “What we give to future generations is not an extra
endowment of private good, that they will get in much higher
quantities than us, but an extra endowment of “resources”
that could be vital for them, even if we are not sure of that. We
are then doing the only useful thing we can do for our heirs.
Pushing the model to its limit, we should give, if we want to
behave in an ethically responsible way, the same utility value
to a degradation of the environment affecting a far time-
distant generation as we do if this degradation is affecting
ourselves.” (Guesnerie, 2007, p. 460).
In the same spirit Thomas Sterner and Martin Persson (2007)
have showed that letting prices to be adjusted to the
increasing scarcity of natural, non producible assets would
lead to results at least equivalent and presumably significantly
more stringent than those of the Stern Review17. They have
used for their demonstration the DICE model worked out by
Nordhaus, and with these new, but sound assumptions,
obtained results opposite to those of the author of DICE.
Beyond the points already discussed, two additional insights
deserve to be mentioned. First, the formalisation and
assumptions adopted by the Stern Review regarding the
discount rate can be seen as an indirect, unorthodox, approach
of the increasing weight given to natural assets and services
due to their increasing scarcity in the long term. Another
interpretation is given by Martin Weitzman (2007a). Not
satisfied with the key values chosen by the Stern Review for the
discount rate, he suggests they may be seen as an indirect
way, and not the most appropriate one, to take account of
possibilities of really catastrophic climate evolutions putting
survival of huge numbers of humans and perhaps mankind
into serious difficulty; in technical terms, the inherently-
thickened left tail of distribution of events representing highly
uncertain but extreme catastrophic evolutions should
dominate the standard assessment of welfare impact. For him
the prospect of climate change is mainly an issue of buying
insurance against such catastrophic possibilities, not of fine-
tuning the distribution of consumption between generations.
Hence his final suggestion that the Stern Review may be right
for the wrong reasons. 
6.4 AN AMBIGUOUS ADAPTATION
If scientists say right and current observations of concrete mani-
festations of climate change are not a dream, some global climate
change is inescapable and is already on track. Any responsible cli-
mate policy has to consider the issue of an adaptation policy.
Several questions have to be addressed: which balance should be
found between the means allocated to adaptation and mitigation
respectively? What is the content and timing of a clever adaptation
strategy? Who should be the main actors in charge of taking
action and who should pay for those measures? And so on.
An excessive asymmetry between present and future 
generations
Ambiguity begins when the adaptation theme is also used by
some scholars as a means to dismiss the necessity of a
strong mitigation approach and make strong attacks against
the Stern Review for having systematically underestimated
the possibilities of victims of damages from climate change
to adapt quite easily. Following on Lomborg's footsteps
(Lomborg, 2001), Tol (2006) sees in the capacity to adapt a
factor of damage abatement of such magnitude that there is
only little left to justify prevention policies. If we push the
argument to its ultimate limit, there is an adaptive solution
to every problem. The future world imagined by Tol and his
likes is a flexible one where people can immediately adapt to
events and catch opportunities by using available resources,
where technical progress has prepared ready solutions to
any problem, where there are no bad synergies between
various types of impacts and events and no cumulative
impacts of repetitive threats and disasters. On the contrary,
according to its description, the economy of present
generations would demonstrate few possibilities to adapt to
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15 More precisely, Malinvaud (1953) established that decentralized agents need to have a complete intertemporal set of prices for all goods and not only the intertemporal price 
of the numeraire (the discount rate) and the present relative prices of other goods in order to achieve an efficient allocation of resources. 
16 For instance the Office of Management and Budget in the US released in January 1996 guidelines for the analysis of federal regulatory reforms. The necessity to consider 
changes in relative prices is briefly noted, quoting the case of certain environmental resources (p. 10-11), but the focus is placed on the concern that this should not be reflected
through an adjustment of the discount rate.
17 This would be the case if we combine both assumptions: changing relative prices and a low social discount rate similar to the one chosen by the Stern Review. Then the policy 
target should be a GHG concentration maintained below 450 ppm and perhaps 400.
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climate challenge or climate policies, without huge
economic and social disorder. The argument is then tailored
in terms of efficiency: it would be much more efficient to bet
on the multiform adaptation capacity of future generations
than on the difficult, costly and poorly effective mitigation
actions that present generations could take. This view is
disputable for several reasons.
Adaptation capacities depend on previous investment
The implicit assumption underpinning the argument is that
adaptation capability is a natural and direct function of wealth.
It may look attractive at first sight, but not so convincing at
second sight. Think of contemporary experience of the
wealthiest countries in the world, deemed incapable for
nearly twenty years to adapt to the new carbon economy. How
many times have we heard that the US, for instance, could not
afford a significant climate policy because it would imperil the
American way of life and crash against structural factors such
as car transportation dependency, the territorial spreading of
cities, threats of unemployment in regions depending on coal
and oil extraction, and so on? In fact if those arguments were
not just bad rhetoric, they tell us that adaptation is not so
much a function of gross wealth than of three main variables:
the economic surplus –the overall investment capability-
produced by an economy to transform and renew its
infrastructure, a concept that has a financial dimension and a
real one (human capital, R & D); the level of irreversible
commitments to high-carbon profiles fixed by passed choices
into territorial features, infrastructures and technologies; and
the level of diversity of opportunities supplied by the current
running of the economy and easily accessible to everyone to
meet a given need. Having the capability to finance investment
is mostly valuable if there are at the same time new
technologies and rich human competences ready to be
mobilized. The three variables –surplus, irreversibility and
diversity- depend critically on investment by previous
generations in developing such potential of future adaptation.
It is not a free gift that any growth trajectory can offer.
Realizing that the potential to adapt depends on previous
investment reinforces the methodological choice of the Stern
Review of not integrating adaptation policies attributed to
future generations in the calculation of a concept of net
damages, as Tol harshly asked. What the Stern Review did to
this regard was to integrate spontaneous adaptation actions
from decentralized agents when they are mentioned in the
literature surveyed, not those that would need public policies
and previous investments to be implemented. The reason is
straightforward: in a cost-benefit framework, it is necessary
to assess possible gross damages imposed by climate change
in order to calibrate how much should be invested in
developing adaptation capacities. There is no point in using
the Lomborg’s fallacious argument according to which future
problems do not exist since future generations will “likely”
solve them (Lomborg, 2001), without seeing that in order for
future generations to solve those problems it is necessary for
previous generations to take the issue seriously and actively
prepare the solutions, while avoiding to fix rigid carbon-
depending productive capital, infrastructures and land use.
Coherently the Stern Review considers adaptation policies in
chapters 18 to 20 as an answer to their assessment of
possible damage.
So the extent of damages as depicted by the Stern Review is
realistic in that it does not assume that we are living in the
best of all worlds, and that the world of the future is likely to
move much closer to perfection. It is however true that
normative choices (equal attention to the welfare of all
generations) and recommendations made (organizing
substantial financial transfers to developing countries, for
example) postulate a form of altruistic determination or
universally shared ethics among present generations which
are hardly attuned to this realistic attitude. 
Why worry for the welfare of people that will be much rich-
er than us?
The co-existence of steadfast long term economic growth at
an annual rate of 1.3% together with a possible catastrophic
picture of damages inflicted by climate change is puzzling.
On this point, Tol (2006) and a few others (for instance Tol &
Yohe, 2006; Weitzman, 2007) argue as follows: according to
the Stern projection, the inhabitants of our planet in 2200
will be 10 to 12 times as rich as those of 2007. To what extent
should the people living in 2008 worry about the fact that the
climate could take 20 or 30% off this future wealth? Those
living in 2200 will still be eight times richer!
Beyond the fact already mentioned that the concept of
wealth has to split between the part obtained by the
consumption of private goods and the part depending on
ecological services, since their evolution will be extremely
contrasted in a baseline scenario of climatic laissez-faire,
beyond the Weitzman’s preoccupation for the possibility of
extreme climatic evolution leading mankind to a terra
incognita and perhaps a threat for survival, I just want to
make a complementary point. It will counter-balance this
apparent evidence that we should not be too much
concerned by the future generations destiny. Assuming a
constant rate of growth of 1.3% during two centuries is a
useful convention to achieve calculations, but does not bring
any guarantee that it will be the case. Taking account of the
surprises brought by history, it is quite possible that growth
will collapse at some moment, because of environmental
crises or for other easily conceived reasons (a new world
war, a huge economic crisis, an extremely devastating
pandemic). Because of the huge inertia of the physics of
climate change, those emissions released between the
XIXth century and 2050, if nothing is done to curb their
growth, will possibly provoke dramatic changes in the
climate for a very long time –several centuries-, whatever
the level of welfare accessible to future generations. The
idea that wealth will surely compensate for climate hazards
38
O. GODARD CLIMATE CHANGE: A SURVEY OF THE STERN REVIEW
S
.
A
.
P
.
I
.
E
N
.
S
is a purely subjective belief that becomes a fallacy when it is
dressed as a scientific fact. There is no serious means to
establish a probability for such a possibility: climatic
catastrophes without wealth.
The ethical point
Let us forget, for a while, all the arguments introduced up to
now that could make us somewhat suspicious about the way
adaptation is used by some critics of the Stern Review, and
consider the following question. Even if it would be less costly
for future generations to adapt to climate change than for
present generations to try and control their emissions in a
way allowing GHGs atmospheric concentrations not
overshooting 550 ppm of CO2e, would it be legitimate for
present generations to transfer the burden in the name of
economic efficiency since this transfer cannot be negotiated
in the context of a free exchange or with the agreement of
future parts? The basic fact to consider is that climate change
is a stock externality damaging a multitude of future
generations, but its counterpart is just benefits for the sole
generations having lived between 1850 and 2050. This
distributional asymmetry raises an ethical issue that is not
appropriately caught by the dressing in terms of efficiency
along the line of the Kaldor-Hicks criterion of potential
compensation. The latter can make sense in a political
community in which all affected stakeholders have economic
mechanisms and institutional procedures to express their
viewpoints and transform potential compensation into a real
one, but not in an asymmetrical intergenerational context of
relations with distant generations. At least, on ethical
grounds, it would be important for the supporters of future
adaptation to support a strong present mixed investment
strategy aiming both at mitigating emissions and developing
potential for future adaptation.
The only way to escape the moral obligation not to leave the
climate costs to future generations for our own benefits is to
demonstrate that our care for future generations will be
better served by alternative actions than by mitigating
climate change. The argument is often put forward. But due
to the quick obsolescence of past investments in numerous
technologies and industrial productive capacities, letting
behind abandoned useless industrial sites and a lot of
waste, we should think twice and really scrutinize which sort
of alternative strategies will provide a better-guaranteed
utility to future generations than maintaining a liveable
global environment.
7. CONCLUSION
Despite all the criticisms, almost all the economists critical of
the Stern Review agree in emphasising that the climate
problem is a genuine one deserving an immediate and
international commitment in favour of some degree of
prevention and adaptation. They also agree that to achieve this,
a cost-effective policy involves the use of economic instruments
which give prices to carbon, and a vigorous stimulation of
research to give birth to new low carbon technologies. The
practical scope of the methodological and theoretical points of
disagreement is therefore confined to selecting the target (a
GHG concentration between 450 and 550 ppm, says the Stern
Review) and to the timetable for controlling GHG emissions and
developing investment in adaptation potential. The points in
dispute are therefore the degree of structural reorientation of
contemporary economies, the level of cost to be accepted in the
short and medium term for the sake of preserving a distant
future and the status to be given to the goal of preserving global
environmental conditions. To a large extent they are ethical and
political issues more than economic ones. Since the
counterpart of GHG emissions is the production of goods and
services for the benefit of present generations, the key feature
of the issue is one of transfer of costs from those who take the
benefits to others that will just have threats and hardship to this
regard (Gardiner, 2006). Efficiency goals cannot escape to be
reframed into ethical and even ontological issues in regard with
the status to give to global ecological conditions of human
existence and the prospect of threats for the moral or physical
survival of mankind (Jonas, 1984). Dressing the whole
discussion as an efficiency issue based on current consumer
preferences, as some critics of the Stern Review do, is
something of a deception and quite a misleading way to qualify
the choices before us. By its main results and conclusions, the
Stern Review puts us on the right track but, sticking to the
standard economic conceptual framework and focusing on
economic growth, has lost an opportunity to make also a
conceptual breakthrough in line with the sustainable
development paradigm.
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